Comparing default predictions in the rating industry for different sets of obligors by Krämer, Walter & Neumärker, Simon
SFB 
823 
Comparing default predictions 
in the rating industry for 
different sets of obligors 
D
iscussion P
aper 
 
Walter Krämer, Simon Neumärker 
 
 
 
Nr. 8/2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparing default predictions in the rating industry for
different sets of obligors*
by
Walter Kra¨mer
Fakulta¨t Statistik, Technische Universita¨t Dortmund, Germany
Phone: 0231/755-3125, Fax: 0231/755-5284
e-mail: walterk@statistik.tu-dortmund.de
and
Simon Neuma¨rker
Fakulta¨t Statistik, Technische Universita¨t Dortmund, Germany
Phone: 0231/755-3869, Fax: 0231/755-5284
e-mail: simon.neumaerker@tu-dortmund.de
Abstract
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21. Introduction
Probability forecasting has a long tradition in many fields of application. In
economics, the most popular ones are default predictions in the rating industry.
According to the Basel-II and Basel-III accords for instance, banks have to attach
predicted default probabilities to all outstanding loans. Although major rating
agencies like Moody’s or S&P are reluctant to identify their letter grades with
predicted default probabilities, we will stick to this probability interpretation in
what follows. Given two competing default predictors and the prevalence of split
ratings in practice (see e.g. Hauck and Neyer (2014)), it is then natural to ask:
Which one is better?
One option is to rely on some scalar measures of performance like the Brier Score.
However, it is well known that different score functions might produce conflicting
results (see e.g. Kra¨mer and Gu¨ttler (2008) for an example). The present paper
therefore is concerned with partial orderings which, if valid, will imply identical
rankings with respect to all members from some suitable class of scoring functions.
It extends Kra¨mer (2006), which covers only identical sets of debtors, to cases
when the two debtors under considerations are not necessarily identical. It is not
concerned with the equally important issue of how ratings are produced in the
first place (see however Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) or Boumparis et al. (2015) for
relevant discussions in the present journal).
Section 2 below introduces a novel partial ordering based on Generalized Lorenz
curves and section 3 provides an application to ten-year default predictions made
by the leading rating agencies Moody’s and S&P.
2. Modified Lorenz Dominance
Let 0 = a1 < a2 < ... < ak = 1 be a finite set of possible default probabilities.
Let qA(aj) be the relative frequency with which the default probability aj is pre-
dicted by forecaster A (similarly for B). This paper will only consider forecasters
which are well calibrated, i.e. where
P(default|aj) = aj (j = 1, . . . , k).(1)
In addition, we will focus on theoretical distributions, i.e. we will not distinguish
between relative default frequencies and default probabilities. Everything that fol-
lows will then depend only on the vectors a = [a1, ..., ak]
′ and q = [q(a1), .., q(ak)]′.
3We are not concerned with methods to produce probability forecasts in the first
place; see Lahiri and Yang (2013) for a most useful overview.
For the special case where A and B are rating the same set of debtors, DeGroot
and Fienberg (1983) suggest the concept of refinement to discriminate between the
two. If, by applying a randomization to the probability forecasts of A, one obtains
a new probability forecast with the same distribution as B, then A is more refined
than B. As shown by DeGroot and Eriksson (1985), this amounts to Lorenz-
domination of the respective forecast distributions:
A ≥L B ⇔ 1
p
∫ x
0
FA
−1
(t)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=LA(x)
≤ 1
p
∫ x
0
FB
−1
(t)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=LB(x)
, (0 ≤ x ≤ 1)(2)
where LA(x) and LB(x) are the respective Lorenz curves and where
FA(a) =
∑
ai≤a
qA(ai)(3)
is A’s default forecast distribution (similarly for B). The overall default probability
can then be expressed as
p =
∫ 1
0
FA
−1
(t)dt =
∫ 1
0
FB
−1
(t)dt(4)
which equals the expectation of both FA and FB . In view of calibration, p =∑
aiq
A(ai) =
∑
aiq
B(ai). This expectation could as well be dropped in equa-
tion (2), as it appears on both sides of the inequality, and mainly sees to it that
both Lorenz curves end in (1, 1).
Contrary to comparing income inequality, where Lorenz curves close to the
diagonal are ”good” (i.e. signal a more equal distribution of income), A is in the
present application considered better than B if its Lorenz curve bends farther away
from the diagonal, i.e. if its predicted default probabilities are more spread out. It
can also easily be shown that the same ordering obtains if the ranking is based on
predicted non-defaults:
∫ x
0
FA
−1
(t)dt ≤
∫ x
0
FB
−1
(t)dt
⇔
∫ x
0
F˜A
−1
(t)dt ≤
∫ x
0
F˜B
−1
(t)dt (0 ≤ x ≤ 1),
(5)
where F˜ (a) =
∑
a˜i≤a(1− qA(a˜i)) is the distribution function of the predicted sur-
vival probabilities a˜i = 1− ai.
4If A and B are rating different (possibly overlapping) sets of debtors, the over-
all probability of default will in general differ between the respective sets, and the
refinement concept does no longer apply. However, the Lorenz-ordering is still pos-
sible, by replacing the overall default probability p = pA = pB in (2) with pA
and pB , where appropriate. Other than in the case pA = pB , it now does matter
whether we consider predicted default or predicted survival probabilities: It can
be shown by simple counterexamples that A’s Lorenz curve for predicted default
probabilities is better and A’s Lorenz curve for predicted survival probabilities is
worse than that of B. Therefore the standard Lorenz order does not make much
sense for nonidentical sets of debtors. Here is an extension:
Definition: A dominates B in the modified Lorenz sense (A ≥ML B) if
A ≥L B (i.e. (2) obtains with pA and pB in place of p) and in addition,
0.5 ≥ pA ≥ pB (pB < 0.5) or 0.5 ≤ pA ≤ pB (pB > 0.5).
For pA = pB , this reduces to the standard refinement ordering. Without loss
of generality, we will confine ourselves to the empirically more relevant case pB <
0.5 in what follows. The inequality pA > pB then implies that the generalized
Lorenz curve (defined as p times standard Lorenz curve) of A is larger than that
of B towards the right end of the [0, 1]-interval. Intuitively, this means that A′s
predictions are both more spread out and on average closer to 0.5 at the same time.
It is well known from the theory of proper scoring rules (see e.g. Winkler (1996))
that it becomes harder to obtain good results as the overall default probability
approaches 0.5. The well known Brier Score for instance, given by
B(a, q) =
k∑
i=1
q(ai)ai(1− ai)(6)
whenever a forecaster is well calibrated, approaches its optimal value of 0 even
for the trivial forecast ai = p ∀i whenever p → 0 or p → 1. And the trivial
forecast is worst in the Brier sense if p = 0.5 (always assuming that p is among
the available ai’s). Two additional scoring rules often used in application are the
logarithmic score
L(a, q) =
k∑
i=1
q(ai) (ai ln(ai) + (1− ai) ln(1− ai)) (with 0 ln(0) := 0)(7)
5and the spherical score
S(a, q) =
k∑
i=1
q(ai)
√
a2i + (1− ai)2,(8)
which are likewise producing good results for the trivial forecasts as p→ 0 or p→ 1.
In order to compensate for this intrinsic difference in difficulty, it is common to
rely on skill scores rather than on ordinary scoring rules whenever pA 6= pB (see
Lahiri and Yang (2013) for additional motivation). Given any scoring rule S(a, q),
the corresponding skill score is given by
SS(a, q) =
S(a, q)− St
Sopt − St(9)
where St is the trivial score obtained for ai = p ∀i and Sopt is the optimal score
where only q(0) and/or q(1) are different from zero (Winkler (1996)). A skill score
then measures how close a forecaster is to the optimum. It takes its maximum
value of 1 if defaults and non-defaults are both predicted with certainty; it takes
the value zero for the trivial forecast, and it can even take on values less than zero
if a forecaster is worse than the trivial forecast. For the Brier-Score, for instance,
we have
BS(a, q) =
B(a, q)− p(1− p)
p(1− p) .(10)
Theorem: For two well calibrated probability forecasters A and B, let A ≥ML B.
Then, for skill scores derived from the Brier-Score, the Logarithmic-Score and the
Spherical-Score, A is at least as good as B.
Proof: The proof builds on Kra¨mer (2006), who establishes the above result
for the case pA = pB . Now, let without loss of generality, 0.5 > pA > pB > 0,
let a∗i =
pB
pA
ai < ai and consider a well calibrated forecaster A
∗ with possible pre-
dictions a∗i . Then A
∗ has the same Lorenz curve as A, while, by construction,
pA∗ = pB . Therefore, A
∗ cannot be worse than B according to any strictly proper
scoring rule.
6Next we show that, for the Brier skill-Score, A cannot be worse than A∗. Rewriting
the Brier skill-Score as
BS(a, q) = 1− B(a, q)
p(1− p) ,(11)
this amounts to
∑
q(ai)cai(1− cai)
cp(1− cp) ≥
∑
q(ai)ai(1− (ai))
p(1− p)(12)
where c = pB/pA. After several trivial reshuﬄings, this inequality is seen to be
equivalent to
∑
q(ai)aip ≤
∑
q(ai)a
2
i ,(13)
which in turn follows from p =
∑
q(ai)ai, the general inequality E(X
2) > [E(X)]2
and the fact that the ai’s can be viewed as the values of a random variable with prob-
ability function q(ai).
In a similar fashion, it is seen that for the logarithmic skill score LS(a?, q) ≤
LS(a, q). For the purpose, rewrite LS as a ratio of a convex and a concave function
PN (c) and PD(c) of c = pB/pA (ceteris paribus) and show that
LS(a?, q) =
PN (c)
PD(c)
≤ cPN (1)
cPD(1)
= LS(a, q).(14)
Given a and q, one can likewise view the spherical score of A? as a function of c via
SS(a?, q) =
∑
q(ai)
√
(cai)2 + (1− cai)2 −
√
1− 2cp(1− cp)
1−√1− 2cp(1− cp) ,(15)
where it can be shown by brute force calculation that ∂SS∂c ≥ 0 for all c ∈ (0, 1), so
SS(a?, q) ≤ SS(a, q). 
As an illustration, consider three well calibrated forecasters A, A∗ and B with pre-
dicted default probabilities and distributions across predicted default probabilities
as in table 1.
7Table 1. Three well calibrated probability forecasters
ai q
A(ai) q
B(ai) q
A∗(ai)
0 0.3 0.2 0.3
10
11 · 0.1 0 0 0.5
0.1 0.5 0.6 0
0.2 0 0.2 0
10
11 · 0.3 0 0 0.2
0.3 0.2 0 0
Then we have pB = pA∗ = 0.1 < pA = 0.11, with Lorenz curves of A (equal to that
of A∗) and B as in figure 1.
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Figure 1. Lorenz curves of predicted default probabilities
It is seen that the Lorenz curve of A is nowhere above that of B, so A ≥ML B in
view of pA > pB . Table 2 reports the respective Brier-Scores, plus the Logarithmic-
Scores L(a, q) and the Spherical-Scores S(a, q) where, contrary to the Brier-Score,
large values of L(a, q) and S(a, q) are ”good”.
8Table 2. Selected scores for predictions from table 1.
Rule A A∗ B
Brier 0.087 0.081 0.086
Logarithmic -0.285 -0.270 -0.295
Spherical 0.905 0.912 0.908
Brier skill 0.111 0.100 0.044
Logarithmic skill 0.178 0.171 0.092
Spherical skill 0.081 0.070 0.029
3. Application
As an illustration, table 3 shows ten-year default rates obtained from the web pages
of Moody’s and S&P (Moody’s (2015) and Standard & Poor’s (2015)).
Table 3. Empirical ten year default rates and distribution of
debtors among rating classes times 100.
Moody’s S&P
Rating Class aMi q
M (ai) a
S
i q
S(ai)
AAA/Aaa 0.49 3.41 0.71 1.07
AA/Aa 0.89 11.50 0.78 7.13
A 2.09 24.26 1.71 22.94
BBB/Baa 4.95 23.18 4.98 26.15
BB/Ba 19.79 14.23 16.38 17.37
B 40.25 17.86 29.97 22.77
CCC/Caa-C 65.97 5.54 51.35 2.56
As we equalize realized relative default frequencies and predicted default proba-
bilities, both agencies are well calibrated by construction. Figure 2 presents the
resulting Lorenz curves; it shows that Moody’s predicted default probabilities are
more spread out.
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Figure 2. Lorenz curves of predicted default probabilities for
Moody’s and S&P.
Since in addition
pM =
7∑
i=1
aMi q
M (ai) = 15.43% > pS =
7∑
i=1
aSi q
S(ai) = 12.74%,(16)
Moody’s dominate S&P in the modified Lorenz sense and are therefore also superior
in terms of the skill scores discussed here (table 4). According to the unmodified
spherical score and brier score, however, S&P is better.
Table 4. Score values for Moody’s and S&P predictions.
Rule Moody’s S&P
Brier 0.0950 0.0948
Logarithmic -0.3039 -0.3095
Spherical 0.8935 0.8953
Brier skill 0.2719 0.1470
Logarithmic skill 0.2935 0.1885
Spherical skill 0.2411 0.1136
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